OXFORD PAMPHLETS ^ 

D 511 

1914 



Copy 2 



^ilE DOUBLE ALLIANCE 



versus 



THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 



BY 

JAMES M. BECK 

FORMER ASSISTANT ATTORNEV-GENERAL 01 THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 



Price Threepence net 



OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 

HUMPHREY MILFORD 

LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW 

NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE BOMBAY 









r 



OXFORD : HORACE HART 
PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY 



INTRODUCTION 

Me. James M. Beck, a distinguished American 
lawyer, was lately invited by the Neiv York Times to 
review the British and German White Books. Many 
such reviews have been written here and in the United 
States. But Mr. Beck conceived the happy idea of 
treating these official documents precisely as they would 
be treated in a court of law. It was a natural course to 
put a review of such a kind, based upon the lawyer's 
canons of evidence, in the form of a legal judgment. 
Mr. Beck handles his intricate subject so lightly and so 
clearly that even those who are well acquainted with 
his subject-matter may find it profitable to study his 
presentment of the two conflicting cases, and the 
grounds of his final decision. I am indebted to the 
publishers of the New York Times and to Mr. Beck for 
their courtesy in permitting republication. 

H. W. C. D. 



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in 2011 with funding from 
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http://www.archive.org/details/doubleallianceveOObeck 



IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CIVILIZATION 



Cbe Case of 

THE DOUBLE ALLIANCE 

VS. 

THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 

Argued by James M. Beck, Former Assistant Attorney- 
General of the United States. 

Let us suppose that in this year of dis-Grace, Nine- 
teen Hundred and Fourteen, there had existed, as let 
us pray will one day exist, a Supreme Court of Civiliza- 
tion, before which the sovereign nations could litigate 
their differences without resort to the iniquitous and 
less effective appeal to the arbitrament of arms. 

Let us further suppose that each of the contending 
nations had a sufficient leaven of Christianity to have 
its grievances adjudged not by the ethics of the cannon 
or the rifle, but by the eternal criterion of justice. 

What would be the judgment of that august tribunal ? 

Any discussion of the ethical merits of this great 
controversy must start with the assumption that there 
is such a thing as international morality. 

This fundamental axiom, upon which the entire basis 
of civilization necessarily rests, is challenged by a small 
class of intellectual perverts. 

Some of these hold that moral considerations must 
be subordinated either to military necessity or so-called 
manifest destiny. This is the Bernhardi doctrine. 



6 THE DOUBLE ALLIANCE 

Others teach that war is a beneficent fatality and 
that all nations engaged in it are therefore equally justi- 
fied. On this theory, all of the now contending nations 
are but victims of an irresistible current of events, and 
the highest duty of the State is to prepare itself for the 
systematic extermination, when necessary, of its neigh- 
bors. 

Notwithstanding the clever platitudes under which 
both these doctrines are veiled, all morally sane minds 
are agreed that this war is a great crime against civili- 
zation, and the only open question is, which of the two 
contending groups of powers is morally responsible for 
that crime ? 

Was Austria justified in declaring war against. Servia ? 

Was Germany justified in declaring war against 
Russia and France ? 

Was England justified in declaring war against 
Germany ? 

As the last of these questions is the most easily dis- 
posed of, it may be considered first. 

England's Justification. 

England's justification rests upon the solemn treaty 
of 1839, whereby Prussia, France, England, Austria, 
and Russia ' became the guarantors ' of the ' perpetual 
neutrality ' of Belgium, as reaffirmed by Count Bismarck, 
then Chancellor of the German Empire, on July 22, 1870, 
and as even more recently reaffirmed in the striking fact 
disclosed in the Belgian ' Grey Book '. 

In the Spring of 1913, a debate was in progress in the 
Budget Committee of the Reichstag with reference to 
the Military Budget. In the course of the debate the 
Germany Secretary of State said : 



VS. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 7 

' The neutrality of Belgium is determined by inter- 
national conventions, and Germany is resolved to 
respect these conventions' 

To confirm this solemn assurance, the Minister of War 
added in the same debate : 

' Belgium does not play any part in the justifica- 
tion of the German scheme of military reorganization. 
The scheme is justified by the position of matters in 
the East. Germany will not lose sight of the fact tliat 
Belgian neutrality is guaranteed by international 
treaties.' 

A year later, on July 31, 1914, Herr von Below, the 
German Minister at Brussels, assured the Belgian 
Department of State that he knew of a declaration 
which the German Chancellor had made in 1911, to the 
effect ' that Germany had no intention of violating our 
neutrality ', and ' that he was certain that the sentiments 
to which expression was given at that time had not 
changed'. (See Belgian ' Gray Book ', Nos. 11 and 12.) 

It seems unnecessary to discuss the wanton disregard 
of these solemn obligations and protestations, when the 
present Chancellor of the German Empire, in his speech 
to the Reichstag and to the world on August 4, 1914, 
frankly admitted that the action of the German military 
machine in invading Belgium was a wrong. He said : 

' We are now in a state of necessity, and necessity 
knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg 
and perhaps are already on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, 
thai is contrary to the dictates of international law. It 
is true that the French Government has declared at 
Brussels that France is willing to respect the neutrality 
of Belgium, so long as her opponent respects it. We 
knew, however, that France stood ready for invasion. 
France could wait, but we could not wait. A French 
movement upon our flank upon the lower Rhine might 



S THE DOUBLE ALLIANCE 

have been disastrous. So we were compelled to over- 
ride the just protest of the Luxemburg and Belgian 
Governments. The wrong — I speak openly — that we 
are committing we will endeavor to make good as soon 
as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who 
is threatened as we are threatened, and is fighting for 
his highest possessions, can only have one thought — 
how he is to hack his way through.' 

This defense is not even a plea of confession and 
avoidance. It is a plea of ' Guilty ' at the bar of the 
world. It has one merit, that it does not add to 
the crime the aggravation of hypocrisy. It virtually 
rests the case of Germany upon the gospel of Treitschke 
and Bernhardi, that each nation is justified in exerting 
its physical power to the utmost in defense of its selfish 
interests. There is no novelty in this gospel. Its only 
surprising feature is its revival in the twentieth century. 
It was taught far more effectively by Machiavelli in his 
treatise, ' The Prince ', wherein he glorified the policy 
of Cesare Borgia in trampling the weaker States of Italy 
under foot by ruthless terrorism, unbridled ferocity, 
and the basest deception. Lideed, the wanton destruc- 
tion of Belgium is simply Borgiaism amplified ten 
thousandfold by the mechanical resources of modern war. 

Unless our boasted civilization is the thinnest veneer- 
ing of barbarism ; unless the law of the world is in fact 
only the ethics of the rifle and the conscience of the 
cannon ; unless mankind after uncounted centuries has 
made no real advance hi political morality beyond that 
of the cave dweller, then this answer of Germany cannot 
satisfy the ' decent respect to the opinions of mankind '. 
Germany's contention that a treaty of peace is ' a scrap 
of paper ', to be disregarded at will when required by 
the selfish interests of one contracting party, is the 
negation of all that civilization stands for. 



VS. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 9 

Belgium has been crucified in the face of the world. 
Its innocence of any offense, until it was attacked, is 
too clear for argument. Its voluntary immolation to 
preserve its solemn guarantee of neutrality will ' plead 
like angels, trumpet-tongued, against the deep dam- 
nation of its taking off '. On that issue the Supreme 
Court could have no ground for doubt or hesitation. 
Its judgment would be speedy and inexorable. 

A War of Diplomats. 

The remaining two issues, above referred to, are not 
so simple. Primarily and perhaps exclusively, the 
ethical question turns upon the issues raised by the 
communications which passed between the various 
Chancellories of Europe in the last week of July, for it 
is the amazing feature of this greatest of all wars that 
it was precipitated by diplomats and, assuming that all 
the diplomats sincerely desired a peaceful solution of 
the questions raised by the Austrian ultimatum (which 
is by no means clear), it was the result of ineffective 
diplomacy and clumsy diplomacy at that. 

I quite appreciate the distinction between the imme- 
diate causes of a war and the anterior and more funda- 
mental causes ; nevertheless, with the world in a state 
of Summer peace on July 23, 1914, an issue, gravely 
affecting the integrity of nations and the balance of 
power in Europe, is suddenly precipitated by the 
Austrian ultimatum, and thereafter and for the space 
of about a week a series of diplomatic communications 
jDassed between the Chancellories of Europe, designed 
on their face to prevent a war and yet so ineffective that 
the war is precipitated and the fearful Rubicon crossed 
before the world knew, except imperfectly, the nature 
of the differences between the Governments involved. 

A 2 



10 THE DOUBLE ALLIANCE 

The ethical aspects of this great conflict must largely 
depend upon the record that has been made up by the 
official communications, which can, therefore, be treated 
as documentary evidence in a litigated case. 

A substantial part of that record is already before the 
court of public opinion in the British and German 
' White Papers ' and the Russian ' Orange Paper ', and 
the purpose of this article is to discuss what judgment 
an impartial and dispassionate court would render upon 
the issues thus raised and the evidence thus submitted. 

The Suppression by Germany and Austria of Vitally 
Important Documents. 

Primarily such a court would be deeply impressed 
not only by what the record as thus made up discloses, 
but also by the significant omissions of documents knoivn 
to be in existence. 

The official defense of England and Russia does not 
apparently show any failure on the part of either to 
submit all of the documents in their possession, but the 
German ' White Paper ' on its face discloses the suppression 
of documents of vital importance, while Austria has as 
yet failed to submit any of the documentary evidence in 
its possession. 

We know from the German ' White Paper ' — even 
if we did not conclude as a matter of irresistible in- 
ference — that many important communications passed 
in this crisis between Germany and Austria, and it is 
probable that some communications must also have 
passed between those two countries and Italy. Italy, 
despite its embarrassing position, owes to the world the 
duty of a full disclosure. What such disclosure would 
probably show is indicated by her deliberate conclusion 



VS. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 11 

that her allies had commenced an aggressive war, which 
released her from any obligation under the Triple 
Alliance. 

The fact that communications passed between Berlin 
and Vienna, the text of which has never been disclosed, 
is not a matter of conjecture. Germany admits and 
asserts as part of her defense that she faithfully exercised 
her mediatory influence with Austria, but not only is 
such mediatory influence not disclosed by any practical 
results of such mediation, but the text of these vital 
communications is still kept in the secret archives of 
Berlin and Vienna. 

Thus in the official apology for Germany it is stated 
that, in spite of the refusal of Austria to accept the 
proposition of Sir Edward Grey to treat the Servian 
reply ' as a basis for further conversations ', 

' we [Germany] continued our mediatory efforts to the 
utmost and advised Vienna to make any possible com- 
promise consistent with the dignity of the Monarchy.' x 

This would be more convincing if the German Foreign 
Office in giving other diplomatic documents had only 
added the text of the advice which it thus gave Vienna. 

The same significant omission will be found when the 
same official defense states that on July 29 the German 
Government advised Austria ' to begin the conversa- 
tions with Mr. Sazonof '. But here again the text is not 
found among the documents which the German Foreign 
Office has given to the world. The communications, 
which passed between that office and its Ambassadors 
in St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, are given in 
extenso, but among the twenty-seven communications 
appended to the German official defense it is most 

1 German ' White Paper '. 



12 THE DOUBLE ALLIANCE 

significant that not a single communication is given 
of the many which passed from Berlin to Vienna 
and only one that passed from Vienna to Berlin. 
This cannot be an accident. Germany has seen fit to 
throw the veil of secrecy over the text of its communi- 
cations to Vienna, although professing to give the pur- 
port of a few of them. 

Until Germany is willing to put the most important 
documents in its possession in evidence, it must not 
be surprised that the world, remembering Bismarck's 
garbling of the Ems dispatch, which precipitated the 
Franco-Prussian war, will be incredulous as to the 
sincerity of Germany's mediatory efforts. 

Austria's Case against Servia. 

To discuss the justice of Austria's grievances against 
Servia would take us outside the documentary record 
and into the realm of disputed facts and would expand 
this discussion far beyond reasonable length. 

Let us therefore suppose arguendo that our imaginary 
court would commence its consideration with the 
assumption that Austria had a just grievance against 
Servia, and that the murder of the Archduke on June 29, 
1914, while in fact committed by Austrian citizens of 
Servian sympathies on Austrian soil, had its inspira- 
tion and encouragement in the political activities either 
of the Servian Government or of political organizations 
of that country. 

The question for decision would then be not whether 
Austria had a just grievance against Servia, but whether 
having regard to the obligations which Austria, as well 
as every other country, owes to civilization, she pro- 
ceeded in the right maimer to redress her grievance. 



VS. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 13 

The Secrecy of the Plan of the Double Alliance. 

On June 28, 1914, the Austrian Crown Prince was 
murdered at Serajevo. For nearly a month there was 
no action by Austria, and no public statement whatever 
of its intentions. The world profoundly sympathized 
with Austria in its new trouble, and especially with its 
aged monarch, who like King Lear was ' as full of grief 
as years and wretched in both '. 

The Servian Government had formally disclaimed 
any complicity with the assassination, and had pledged 
itself to punish any Servian citizen implicated therein. 

From time to time, from June 28 to Jvdy 23, there 
came semi-inspired intimations from Vienna that that 
country intended to act with great self-restraint and 
in the most pacific manner. Never was it even hinted 
that Germany and Austria were about to apply in a 
time of profound peace a match to the powder-magazine 
of Europe. 

This is strikingly shown by the first letter in the 
English ' White Paper ' from Sir Edward Grey to 
Sir H. Rumbold, dated July 20, 1914. It is one of the 
most significant documents in the entire correspondence. 
At the time this letter was written it is altogether 
probable that Austria's arrogant and most unreason- 
able ultimatum had already been framed and approved 
in Vienna, and possibly in Berlin, and yet Sir Edward 
Grey, the Foreign Minister of a great and friendly country, 
had so little knowledge of Austria's policy that he 

' asked the German Ambassador to-day (July 20) if 
he had any news of what was going on in Vienna 
with regard to Servia.' The German Ambassador 
replied ' that he had not, but Austria was certainly 
going to take some step'. 



14 THE DOUBLE ALLIANCE 

Sir Edward Grey adds that he told the German 
Ambassador that he had learned that Count Berchtold, 
the Austrian Foreign Minister, 

' in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, 
had deprecated the suggestion that the situation was 
grave, but had said that it should be cleared up'. 

The German Minister then replied that it would be 
desirable ' if Russia could act as a mediator with regard 
to Servia ', so that the first suggestion of Russia playing 
the part of the peacemaker came from the German 
Ambassador in London. Sir Edward Grey then adds 
that he told the German Ambassador that he 

' assumed that the Austrian Government would not 
do anything until they had first disclosed to the 
public their case against Servia, founded presumably 
upon what they had discovered at the trial', 

and the German Ambassador assented to this assump- 
tion. 1 

Either the German Ambassador was then deceiving 
Sir Edward Grey, on the theory that the true function 
of an Ambassador is ' to lie for his country ', or the 
thunderbolt was being launched with such secrecy that 
even the German Ambassador in England did not know 
what was then in progress. 

The British Ambassador at Vienna reports to Sir 
Edward Grey : 

' The delivery at Belgrade on the 23d July of the 
note to Servia was preceded by a period of absolute 
silence at the Ballplatz.' 

He proceeds to say that with the exception of the 
German Ambassador at Vienna — note the significance 
of the exception — not a single member of the Diplo- 

1 English ' White Paper ', No. 1. 



VS. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 15 

matic Corps knew anything of the Austrian ultimatum 
and that the French Ambassador when he visited the 
Austrian Foreign Office on July 23 was not only kept 
in ignorance that the ultimatum had actually been 
issued, but was given the impression that its tone was 
moderate. Even the Italian Ambassador was not taken 
into Count Berchtold's confidence. 1 

Did Germany Know Of or Inspire the Ultimatum? 

The interesting and important question here sug- 
gests itself whether Germany had knowledge of and 
approved in advance the Austrian ultimatum. If it did, 
it was guilty of duplicity, for the German Ambassador 
at St. Petersburg gave to the Russian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs an express assurance that 

' the German Government had no knowledge of the 
text of the Austrian note before it was handed in and 
has not exercised any influence on its contents. It is 
a mistake to attribute to Germany a threatening atti- 
tude'. 2 

This statement is inherently improbable. Austria 
was the weaker of the two Allies and it was Germany's 
sabre that it was rattling in the face of Europe. Ob- 
viously Austria could not have proceeded to extreme 
measures, which it was recognized from the first would 
antagonize Russia, unless she had the support of Ger- 
many, and there is a probability, amounting to a moral 
certainty, that she would not have committed herself 
and Germany to the possibility of a European war 
without first consulting Germany. 

1 Dispatch from Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, dated 
September 1, 1914. 

"■ Russian ' Orange Paper ', No. 18, 



16 THE DOUBLE ALLIANCE 

Moreover, we have the testimony of Sir M. de Bunsen, 
the English Ambassador in Vienna, who advised Sir 
Edward Grey that he had ' private information that 
the German Ambassador (at Vienna) knew the text of 
the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was dis- 
patched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor ', 
and that the German Ambassador himself ' indorses 
every line of it ' . x As he does not disclose the source 
of his ' private information ', this testimony would 
not by itself be convincing, but when we examine 
Germany's official defense in the German ' White 
Paper ', we find that the German Foreign Office admits 
that it was consulted by Austria previous to the ultimatum 
and not only approved of Austria's course but literally 
gave her a carte blanche to proceed. 

This point seems so important in determining the 
sincerity of Germany's attitude and pacific protesta- 
tions that we quote in extenso. After referring to the 
previous friction between Austria and Servia, the 
German ' White Paper ' says : 

' In view of these circumstances Austria had to 
admit that it would not be consistent either with 
the dignity or self-preservation of the Monarchy to 
look on longer at the operations on the other side 
of the border without taking action. The Austro- 
Hungarian Government advised us of this view of the 
situation and asked our opinion in the matter. We were 
able to assure our ally most heartily of our agreement 
with her view of the situation and to assure her that 
any action that she might consider it necessary to take 
in order to put an end to the movement in Servia directed 
against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
ivould receive our approval. We were fully aware in 
this connection that warlike moves on the part of 
Austria-Hungary against Servia would bring Russia 

1 English ' White Paper ', No. 95. 



VS. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 17 

into the question and might draw us into a war in 
accordance with our duties as an ally.' 

Sir M. de Bunsen's credible testimony is further 
confirmed by the fact that the British Ambassador at 
Berlin in his letter of July 22, to Sir Edward Grey, 
states that on the f receding night (July 21) he had met 
the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and 
an allusion was made to a possible action by Austria. 

' His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this 
step on Austria's part would have been made ere 
this. He insisted that the question at issue was one 
for settlement between Servia and Austria alone, and 
that there should be no interference from outside in 
the discussions between those two countries.' 

He adds that while he had regarded it as inadvisable 
that his country should approach Austria-Hungary in 
the matter, he had 

' on several occasions in conversation with the Servian 
Minister emphasized the extreme importance that 
Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper 
footing ' } 

Here we have the first statement of Germany's 
position in the matter, a position which subsequent 
events showed to be entirely untenable, but to which 
Germany tenaciously adhered to the very end, and 
which did much to precipitate the war. Forgetful of 
the solidarity of European civilization, and the fact that 
by policy and diplomatic intercourse continuing through 
many centuries a United European State exists, even 
though its organization be as yet inchoate, he took the 
ground that Austria should be permitted to proceed 
to aggressive measures against Servia without inter- 
ference from any other Power, even though, as was 

1 English ' White Paper ', No. 2, 
A 3 



18 THE DOUBLE ALLIANCE 

inevitable, the humiliation of Servia would destroy the 
status of the Balkan States and even threaten the 
European balance of power. 

No space need be taken in convincing any reasonable 
man that this Austrian ultimatum to Servia was brutal 
in its tone and unreasonable in its demands. It would 
be difficult to find in history a more offensive document, 
and its iniquity was enhanced by the short shriving 
time which it gave either Servia or Europe. Servia 
had forty-eight hours to answer whether it would com- 
promise its sovereignty, and virtually admit its com- 
plicity in a crime which it had steadily disavowed. 
As the ftdl text of the ultimatum first reached the Foreign 
Chancelleries nearly twenty-four hours after its service 
upon Servia, the other European nations had barely 
a day to consider what could be done to preserve the 
peace of Europe before that peace was fatally compro- 
mised. 1 

Further confirmation that the German Foreign Office 
did have advance knowledge of at least the substance 
of the ultimatum is shown by the fact that on the day 
the ultimatum was issued the Chancellor of the German 
Empire instructed the German Ambassadors in Paris, 
London, and St. Petersburg to advise the English, 
French, and Russian Governments that 

' the acts as well as the demands of the Austro- 
Himgarian Government cannot but be looked upon 
as justified '. 2 

How could Germany thus indorse the ' demands ' if 
it did not know the substance of the ultimatum ? 
The hour when these instructions were sent is not given, 

1 English ' White Paper ', No. 5 ; Russian ' Orange Paper ', No. 3. 

2 German ' White Paper ', Annex 1 B. 



VS. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 19 

so that it does not follow that these significant instruc- 
tions were necessarily prior to the service of the ulti- 
matum at Belgrade at 6 p.m. Nevertheless, as the 
ultimatum did not reach the other capitals of Europe 
until the following day, as the diplomatic correspon- 
dence clearly shows, it seems improbable that the 
German Foreign Office would have issued this very 
carefully prepared and formal warning to the other 
powers on July the 23rd imless it had not only knowledge 
of Austria's intention to serve the ultimatum but also 
at least of the substance thereof. 

While it may be that Germany, while indorsing in 
blank the policy of Austria, purposely refrained from 
examining the text of the communication, so that it 
could thereafter claim that it was not responsible for 
Austria's action — a policy which would not lessen the 
discreditable character of the whole business — yet the 
more reasonable assumption is that the simultaneous 
issuance of Austria's ultimatum at Belgrade and Ger- 
many's warning to the Powers were the result of a con- 
certed action and had a common purpose. No court 
or jury, reasoning along the ordinary inferences of 
human life, would question this conclusion for a moment. 

The communication from the German Foreign Office 
last referred to anticipates that Servia ' will refuse to 
comply with these demands ' — why, if they were justi- 
fied '? — and Germany suggests to France. England, and 
Bussia that if, as a result of such non-compliaz)ce, 
Austria has ' recourse to military measures ', that ' the 
choice of means must be left to it '. 

The German Ambassadors in the three capitals were 
instructed 

' to lay particular stress on the view that the above 
question is one the settlement of which devolves 



20 THE DOUBLE ALLIANCE 

solely upon Austria-Hungary and Servia, and one 
which the Powers should earnestly strive to confine 
to the two countries concerned ', 

and he added that Germany strongly desired 

' that the dispute be localized, since any intervention 
of another Power, on account of the various alliance 
obligations, would bring consequences impossible to 
measure ' . 

This is one of the most significant documents in the 
whole correspondence. If Germany were as ignorant 
as her Ambassador at London affected to be of the 
Austrian policy and ultimatum, and if Germany was 
not then instigating and supporting Austria in its 
perilous course, why should the German Chancellor 
have served this threatening notice upon England, 
France, and Russia, that Austria must be left free to 
make war upon Servia, and that any attempt to inter- 
vene in behalf of the weaker nation would ' bring con- 
sequences impossible to measure ' V 1 

A few days later the Imperial Chancellor sent to the 
Confederated Governments of Germany a confidential 
communication in which he recognized the possibility 
that Russia might feel it a duty ' to take the part of 
Servia in her dispute with Austria-Hungary '. Why 
again, if Austria's case was so clearly justified ? The 
Imperial Chancellor added that 

" if Russia feels constrained to take sides with Servia 
in this conflict, she certainly has a right to do it ' , 

but added that if Russia did this it woidd in effect 
challenge the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Mon- 
archy, and that Russia would therefore alone — 

1 German ' White Paper ', Annex 1 B. 



VS. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 21 

' bear the responsibility if a European war arises from 
the Austro-Servian question, which all the rest of the 
great European Powers wish to localize '. 

In this significant confidential communication the 
German Chancellor declares the strong interest which 
Germany had in the punishment of Servia by Austria. 
He says ' our closest interests therefore summon us to the 
side of Austria-Hungary ', and he adds that 

'if, contrary to hope, the trouble should spread, owing 
to the intervention of Russia, then, true to our duty 
as an ally, we should have to support the neighbouring 
monarchy with the entire might of the German 
Empire '- 1 

The Efforts to Maintain Peace. 

In reaching its conclusion our imaginary court would 
pay little attention to mere professions of a desire for 
peace. A nation, like an individual, can covertly stab 
the peace of another while saying, ' Art thou in health, 
my brother ? ' and even the peace of civilization can be 
betrayed by a Judas kiss. Professions of peace belong 
to the cant of diplomacy and have always characterized 
the most bellicose of nations. 

No war in modern times has been begun without the 
aggressor pretending that his nation wished nothing but 
peace, and invoking Divine aid for its murderous policy. 
To paraphrase the words of Lady Teazle on a noted 
occasion when Joseph Surface talked much of ' honor ', 
it might be as well in such instances to leave the name 
Of God out of the question. 

Let us, then, analyze the record as already made up ; 
and for the sake of clearness the events which preceded 
the war will be considered chronologically. 
1 German ' White Paper ', Annex 2. 



22 THE DOUBLE ALLIANCE 

Immediately upon the receipt of the ultimatum in 
St. Petersburg on July 24, the Russian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, in a formal communication to Austria- 
Hungary, suggested that the abrupt time limit ' leaves 
to the Powers a delay entirely insufficient to undertake 
any useful steps whatever for the straightening out of 
the complications that have arisen', and added : 

1 To prevent the incalculable consequences, equally 
disastrous for all the Powers, which can follow the 
method of action of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment, it seems indispensable to us that above all the 
delay given to Servia to reply should be extended.' 

Sazonof further suggested that time should be given 
for the Powers to examine the results of the inquiry 
that the Austro-Hungarian Government had made in 
the matter of the Serajevo assassination, and stated 
that if the Powers were convinced 

' of the well-groundedness of certain of the Austrian 
demands they would find themselves in a position to 
send to the Servian Government consequential advice '. 

He justly observes that 

' a refusal to extend the terms of the ultimatum . . . 
would be in contradiction with the very bases of 
international relations '. 1 

Could any court question the justice of this conten- 
tion ? The peace of the world was at stake. Time 
only was asked to see what could be done to preserve 
that peace and satisfy Austria's grievances to the utter- 
most farthing. 

Concurrently with Sazonoff's plea for a little time to 
preserve the peace of the world Sir Edward Grey had 

1 Russian ' Orange Paper ', No. 4. 



VS. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 23 

seen the German Ambassador on July 24, and had 
suggested to him that the only method of preventing 
the catastrophe was 

' that the four Powers, Germany, France, Italy, and 
ourselves (England) should work together simul- 
taneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg '. 1 

Germany had only to intimate to Austria that ' a 
decent respect to the opinions of mankind ', as well as 
common courtesy to great and friendly nations, re- 
quired that sufficient time be given not only to Servia, 
but to the other nations, to concert for the common good, 
especially as the period was one of Summer dullness and 
many of the leading rulers and statesmen were absent 
from their respective capitals. 

Under these cirmunstances was it not natural that 
Russia shoidd announce on July 24 

' that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Servia 
would not leave Russia indifferent ', 

and on the same day the Russian Charge d" Affaires at 
Vienna suggested to the Austrian Foreign Office 

; that the Austrian note was drawn up in a form ren- 
dering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and 
that it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms '. 

To which the only reply of the Austrian Foreign 
Minister was that their representative in Servia 

' was under instructions to leave Belgrade unless 
Austrian demands were accepted in their integrity 
by 4 p.m. to-morrow '. 2 

Austria's only concession then or subsecpiently to the 
cause of peace was the assurance that Austria would 
not after its conquest of Servia demand any territory. 

1 English ; White Paper ', No. 11. 
1 English ' White Paper ', No. 7. 



24 THE DOUBLE ALLIANCE 

The action of Germany on this day, July 24, is most 
significant. Its Ambassador in England communicated 
a note to Sir Edward Grey, in which it justified Austro- 
Hungarian grievances and ultimatum by saying that 

' under these circumstances the course of procedure 
and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government 
can only be regarded as equitable and moderate'. 

The note added : 

' The Imperial Government [Germany] want to 
emphasize their opinion that in the present case there 
is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively 
between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the 
great Powers ought seriously to endeavor to reserve 
it to those two immediately concerned.' 1 

On July 25, probably to the great surprise of both 
Germany and Austria, which had definitely calculated 
upon Servia's non-compliance with the ultimatum, the 
latter country, under the conciliatory advice of Russia, 
made a reply in which, at the sacrifice of its self-respect 
as a sovereign State, it substantially accepted all but 
one of the demands of Austria, and as to that it did not, 
in terms, refuse it, but expressed its willingness to refer 
it either to arbitration or to a conference of the Powers. 2 

No court would question for a moment the conclusion 
that the reply was a substantial acquiescence in the 
extreme Austrian demands, nor indeed did either 
Germany or Austria seriously contend that it was not. 
They contented themselves with impeaching the sin- 
cerity of the assurances, calling the concessions ' shams ', 
and of this it is enough to say that if Germany and 
Austria had accepted Servia's reply as sufficient, and 

1 English ' White Paper ', No. 9. 
= English ' White Paper ', No. 39. 



VS. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 25 

Servia had subsequently failed to fulfill its promises 
thus made in the utmost good faith, there would have 
been little sympathy for Servia, and no general war. 
Indeed, both Russia and England pledged their in- 
fluence to compel Servia, if necessary, to meet fully any 
reasonable demand of Austria. The outstanding ques- 
tion, which Servia agreed to arbitrate or leave to the 
Powers, was the participation of Austrian officials in the 
Servian courts. This did not present a difficult problem. 
Austria's professed desire for an impartial investigation 
could have been easily attained by having the neutral 
Powers appoint a commission of jurists to make such 
investigation. 

On July 24 Sir Edward Grey also had asked the 
German Ambassador to use his good influences at Vienna 
to secure an extension of time. To this most reasonable 
request the answer and action of the German Government 
was disingenuous in the extreme. They agreed to ' pass 
on ' the suggestion, but the German Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs added that as the Austrian Prime 
Minister was away from Vienna there would be delay 
and difficulty in getting the time limit extended, and 

' he admitted quite freely that the Austro-Hungarian 
Government wished to give the Servians a lesson and 
. that they meant to take military action. He also admitted 
that the Servian Government could not swallow certain 
of the Austro-Hungarian demands'. 

He added that German}? did not want a general war 
and ' he would do all in his power to prevent such a 
calamity'. 1 

If Germany made any communication to Austria 
in the interests of peace the text has yet to be 
disclosed to the world. A word from Berlin to Vienna 
1 English ' White Paper ', Xos. 11 and 18. 



26 THE DOUBLE ALLIANCE 

would have given the additional time which, with 
sincerely pacific intentions, might have resulted in the 
preservation of peace. Germany, so far as the record 
discloses, never spoke that word. 

Contrast this attitude with that of Russia, whose 
Foreign Minister on the morning of July 25 offered 

' to stand aside and leave the question in the hands 
of England, France, Germany, and Italy'. 1 

On July 25 Sir Edward Grey proposed that the four 
Powers (including Germany) should unite 

' in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments 
not to cross the frontier and to give time for the four 
Powers, acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg, to try 
and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this 
view I feel strongly that France and ourselves should 
act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co -operate '? 

To this reasonable request the Imperial German 
Chancellor replied : 

' First and last, we take the ground that this ques- 
tion must be localized by the abstention of all the Powers 
from intervention in it,' 

but added that Germany would, if an Austro -Russian 
dispute arose, 

' co-operate with the other great Powers in mediation 
between Russia and Austria.' 3 

This distinction is very hard to grasp. It attempts 
to measure the difference between tweedledum and 
tweedledee. Russia's difference with Austria was over 
the attempt of the latter to crush Servia. Germany 
would not interfere in the latter, but would mediate 

1 English ' White Paper ', No. 17. 

2 English ' White Paper ', Nos. 24 and 25. 

3 German ' White Paper ', Annex 13. 



VS. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 27 

between Russia and Austria. For all practical purposes 
the two things were indistinguishable. 

How she ' co-operated ' we shall presently see. 

All that Germany did on July 25, so far as the record 
discloses, was to ' pass on ' England's and Russia's 
requests for more time, but subsequent events indicate 
that it was ' passed on ' without any indorsement, for 
is it credible that Austria would have ignored its ally's 
request for more time if it had ever been made ? 

The Austrian Foreign Minister, having launched the 
idtimatum, absented himself from the capital, but the 
Russian Minister at Vienna succeeded in submitting 
this most reasonable request verbally to the Acting- 
Foreign Minister, who simply said that he would submit 
it to Count Berchtold, but that he could predict with 
assurance a categorical refusal. Later on that day 
(July 25) Pvussia was definitely advised that no time 
extension would be granted. 1 

Was ever the peace of the world shattered upon so 
slight a pretext ? A little time, a few days, even a few 
hours, might have sufficed to preserve the world from 
present horrors, but no time could be granted. A 
colossal snap judgment was to be taken by these 
diplomatic pettifoggers. It would be difficult to find in 
recorded history a greater discourtesy to a friendly 
Power, for Austria was not at war with Russia. 

Defeated in their effort to get an extension of time. 
England, France, and Russia made further attempts 
to preserve peace by temporarily arresting military 
proceedings until efforts toward conciliation could be 
made. Sir Edward Grey proposed to Germany, France, 
Russia, and Italy that they should unite in asking 
Austria and Servia not to cross the frontier ' until we 
1 Russian ' Orange Paper ', Nos. 11 and 12. 



28 THE DOUBLE ALLIANCE 

had had time to try and arrange matters between them ', 
but the German Ambassador read Sir Edward Grey 
a telegram that he had received from the German 
Foreign Office that ' once she [Austria] had launched 
that note [the ultimatum] Austria could not draw 
back '. 1 

As we have seen, Germany never, so far as the record 
discloses, sought in any way to influence Austria to 
make this or any concession. Its attitude was shown 
by the declaration of its Ambassador at Paris to the 
French Minister of Foreign Affairs, which; while dis- 
claiming that Germany had countenanced the Austrian 
ultimatum, yet added that Germany approved its 
point of view, 

' and that certainly the arrow, once sent, Germany 
could not allow herself to be guided except by her 
duty to her ally.' 

This seemed to be the fatal fallacy of Germany, that 
her duties to civilization were so slight that she should 
support her ally, Austria, whether the latter was right 
or wrong. Such was her policy, and she carried it out 
with fatal consistency. To support her ally in actual 
war may be defensible, but to support her in times of 
peace in an iniquitous demand and a policy of gross 
discourtesy offends every sense of international morality. 

On the following day Russia proposed to Austria 
that they should enter into an exchange of private 
views, with the object of an alteration in common of 
some clauses of the Austrian note of July 23. To this 
Austria never even replied. The Russian Minister com- 
municated this suggestion to the German Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and expressed the hope that he would 

1 English ' White Paper ', No. 25. 



VS. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 29 

' find it possible to advise Vienna to meet our proposal ', 
but this did not accord with German policy, for on that 
day the German Ambassador in Paris called upon the 
French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and in reply to 
a similar suggestion that Germany should suggest to 
Vienna to meet Servia in the same conciliatory spirit 
which Servia had shown, the Ambassador answered 
that that ' was not possible in view of the resolution 
taken not to interfere in the Austro-Servian conflict '. 

On the same day England asked France, Italy, and 
Germany to meet in London for an immediate con- 
ference to preserve the peace of Europe, and to this 
fruitful suggestion, which might have saved the peace 
of Europe, the German Chancellor replied with the 
pitiful quibble that ' it is impossible to bring our ally 
before a European court in its difference with Servia ', 
although it affected to accept ' in principle ', the policy 
of mediation. 

Germany's acceptance ' in principle ' of a policy 
which she in practice thwarted suggests the law-abiding- 
tendencies of that Maine statesman who was ' for the 
Maine prohibition liquor law, but against its enforce- 
ment '- 1 

Germany's refusal to have Servia's case submitted 
to the Powers even for their consideration is the more 
striking when it is recalled that the German Ambassador 
at London quoted to Sir Edward Grey the German 
Secretary of State as saying 

' that there were some things in the Austrian note 
that Servia could hardly be expected to accept ', 

thus recognizing that Austria's ultimatum was, at 
least in part, unjust. Sir Edward Grey then called the 

1 English ' White Paper', No. 46. 



30 THE DOUBLE ALLIANCE 

German Ambassador's attention to the fact that if 
Austria refused the conciliatory reply of Servia and 
marched into that country 

' it meant that she was determined to crush Servia 
at all costs, being reckless of the consequences that 
might be involved '. 

He added that the Servian reply 

' should at least be treated as a basis for discussion 
and pause ', 

and asked that the German Government should urge 
this at Vienna, but the German Secretary of State on 
July 27 replied that such a conference ' was not prac- 
ticable ', and that it ' would practically amount to 
a court of arbitration ', and could not, in his opinion, 
be called together ' except at the request of Austria 
and Russia \ 1 

That this was a mere evasion is perfectly plain. 
Germany already knew that Austria would not ask for 
such a conference, for Austria had already refused 
Russia's request for an extension of time and had actually 
commenced its military operations. Germany's attitude 
is best indicated by the letter of the Russian Minister 
in Germany to the Russian Foreign Office in which he 
states that on July 27 he called at the German Foreign 
Office and asked it 

' to urge upon Vienna in a more pressing fashion to 
take up this line of conciliation. Jagow replied that 
he could not advise Austria to yield '. 2 

Why not? Russia had advised Servia to yield and 
Servia had conceded nearly every claim. Why could 
not the German Foreign Office advise Vienna to meet 

1 English ' White Paper ', Nos. 43 and 46. 

2 Russian.' Orange Paper ', No. 38, 



VS. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 31 

conciliation by conciliation, if its desire for peace were 
sincere ? 

Before this interview took place, the French Ambas- 
sador had called at the German Foreign Office on 
a similar errand and urged the English suggestion that 
action should at once be taken by England, Germany, 
Russia and France at St. Petersburg and Vienna, to 
the effect that Austria and Servia 

' should abstain from any act which might aggravate 

the situation at the present hour '. 

By this was meant that there should be, pending' 
further parleys, no invasion of Servia by Austria and 
none of Austria by Russia. To this the German Foreign 
Minister opposed a categorical refusal. 

On the same day the Russian Ambassador at Vienna 
had ' a long and earnest conversation ' with the Austrian 
Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He 
expressed the earnest hope that 

' something would be done before Servia was actually 
invaded. Baron Macchio replied that this would 
now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken 
place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been 
aggressors '. 

The Russian Ambassador then said that his country 
would do all it could to keep the Servians quiet, 

' and even to fall back before an Austrian advance 
in order to gain time.' 

He urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. 
Petersburg should be furnished with full powers to 
continue discussions with the Russian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, 

' who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all 
that could be fairly asked of her as an independent 
power.' 



32 THE DOUBLE ALLIANCE 

The only reply to this reasonable suggestion was that 
it would be submitted to the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 1 

On the same day the German Ambassador at Paris 
called upon the French Foreign Office and strongly 
insisted on the ' exclusion of all 'possibility of media- 
tion or of conference' , and yet contemporaneously the 
Imperial German Chancellor was advising London that 
he had 

' started the efforts towards mediation in Vienna, 
immediately in the way desired by Sir Edward Grey, 
and had further communicated to the Austrian 
Foreign Minister the wish of the Russian Foreign 
Minister for a direct talk in Vienna '. 

What hypocrisy ! In the formal German defense, 
the official apologist for that country, after stating his 
conviction 

' that an act of mediation could not take into con- 
sideration the Austro-Servian conflict, which was 
purely an Austro -Hungarian affair ', 

claimed that Germany had transmitted Sir Edward 
Grey's further suggestion to Vienna, in which Austria- 
Hungary was urged 

; either to agree to accept the Servian answer as 
sufficient or to look upon it as a basis for further 
conversations ' ; 

but the Austro -Hungarian Government — playing the 
role of the wicked partner of the combination — ' in full 
appreciation of our mediatory activity ' (so says the 
German ' White Paper ' with sardonic humor), replied 
to this proposition that, coming, as it did, after the 
opening of hostilities, ' it was too late' . 

1 English ' White Paper ', No. 50. 



VS. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 33 

Does any reasonable man question for a moment 
that, if Germany had done something more than merely 
' transmit ' these wise and pacific suggestions, Austria 
would have complied with the suggestions of its powerful 
ally or that Austria would have suspended its military 
operations if Germany had given any intimation of 
such a wish '? On the following day, July 28, the door 
was further closed on any possibility of compromise 
when the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs 

' said, quietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be 
accepted on the basis of the Servian note ; that war 
would be declared today, and that the well-known 
pacific character of the Emperor, as well as, he might 
add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee that 
the war was both just and inevitable ; that this was 
a matter that must be settled directly between the 
two parties immediately concerned '. 

To this arrogant and unreasonable contention that 
Europe must accept the guarantee of the Austrian 
Foreign Minister as to the righteousness of Austria's 
quarrel, the British Ambassador suggested ' the larger 
aspect of the question ', namely, the peace of Europe, 
and to this 'larger aspect', which should have given 
any reasonable official some ground for pause, the 
Austrian Foreign Minister replied that he 

' had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought 
not to oppose operations like those impending, which 
did not aim at territorial aggrandizement, and which 
could no longer be postponed ' . x 

The private conversations between Russia and Austria 
having thus failed, Russia returned to the proposition of 
a European conference to preserve its peace. Its Am- 
bassador in Vienna on July 28 had a conference with 

1 English ' White Paper ', No. 62. 



34 THE DOUBLE ALLIANCE 

Berehtold and pointed to the dangers to the peace of 
Europe and the desirability of good relations between 
Austria-Hungary and Russia. 

To this Count Berehtold replied that he understood 
perfectly well the seriousness of the situation and the 
advantages of a frank explanation with the Cabinet 
at St. Petersburg. 

' He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro- 
Hungarian Government, which had only reluctantly 
decided upon the energetic measures which it had 
taken against Servia, could now neither withdraw nor 
enter upon any discussion of the terms of the Austro- 
Hungarian note.' 1 

On the same day, July 28, the German Imperial 
Chancellor sent for the English Ambassador and excused 
his failure to accept the proposal of conference of the 
neutral Powers, on the ground that he did not think it 
would be effective, 

' because such a conference would in his opinion, 
have the appearance of an " Areopagus " consisting 
of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment upon 
the two remaining Powers.' 

After engaging in this, pitiful and insincere quibble, 
and when reminded of Servia's conciliatory reply, 
amounting to a virtual surrender, 

' his Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss 
the Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and 
in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia 
was a purely Austrian concern, with which Russia 
had nothing to do.' 2 

1 Russian ' Orange Paper ', No. 45. 
- English ' White Paper ', No. 71. 



VS. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 35 

The Mobilization of the Nations. 

At this point the rulers of the countries intervened in 
the dispute. The Kaiser, having returned from Norway, 
telegraphed the Czar, under date of July 28, that he was 

' exerting all my influence to endeavor to make 
Austria-Hungary come to an open and satisfying 
understanding with Russia '. 

and invoked the Czar's aid. 1 

If the Kaiser were sincere, and he may have been, 
his attitude was not that of his Foreign Office. Upon the 
face of the record we have only his own assurance that 
he was doing everything to preserve peace, but the 
steps that he took or the communications he made to 
influence Austria are not found in the formal defense 
which the German Government has given to the world. 
The Kaiser can only convince the world of his innocence 
of the crime of his Potsdam camarilla by giving the 
world the text of any advice he gave the Austrian officials. 
He has produced his telegrams to the Czar. Where are 
those he presumably sent to Francis Joseph or Count 
Berchtold ? Where are the instructions he gave his Am- 
bassadors or Foreign Minister ? 

It is significant that on the same day Sazonof tele- 
graphed to Count Benckendorff : 

'My conversations with the German Ambassador con- 
firm my impression that Germany is rather favorable 
to the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria.' 

and he adds, and history will vindicate him in the con- 
clusion, that 

' the Berlin Cabinet, which might have been able to 
arrest the whole development of this crisis, seems 
to exercise no action on its ally'. 2 

1 German ' White Paper ', Annex 20. 

• Russian ' Orange Paper ', No. 43. 



36 THE DOUBLE ALLIANCE 

On July 29, Sir Edward Goschen telegraphed Sir 
Edward Grey that he had that night seen the German 
Chancellor, who had ' just returned from Potsdam ', 
where he had presumably seen the Kaiser. The German 
Chancellor then showed clearly how the wind was blow- 
ing, in making the suggestion to Sir Edward Goschen 
that if England would remain neutral, Germany would 
agree to guarantee that she would not take any French 
territory. When asked about the French colonies, no 
assurance was given. 1 

Later in the day the German Chancellor again saw 
the English Ambassador, and expressed regret 

' that events had marched too rapidly, and that it 
was therefore too late to act upon your [Sir Edward 
Grey's] suggestion that the Servian reply might form 
the basis of discussion '. 2 

On the same day the Ambassador for Germany at 
St. Petersburg called upon Sazonof and expressed him- 
self in favor of further explanations between Vienna and 
St. Petersburg, to which Sazonof assented. 3 On the same 
day Sir Edward Grey asked the German Government 

' to suggest any form of procedure under which the 
idea of mediation between Austria and Russia, already 
accepted by the German Government in principle, 
could be applied' . 

To which the German Foreign Office replied that it 
could not act for fear that if they made to their ally 
any suggestion that looked like pressure, it might ' cause 
them [Austria] to precipitate matters and present a fait 
accompli' .* 

1 English ' White Paper ', No. 85. 
"- English ' White Paper ', No. 75. 

3 Russian ' Orange Paper', No. 49. 

4 See letter of Sir Edward Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, July 29 
—English ' White Paper ', No. 70. 



VS. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 37 

This was the last and worst of the quibbles put forth 
to gain time while Austria was making progress toward 
Belgrade. It assumes that Austria might not only fail 
to respect the wish in a matter of common concern of 
its more powerful ally, but that it might act in disregard 
of Germany's wish. This strains human credulity to 
the breaking point. Did the German Secretary of 
State keep a straight face when he uttered this sardonic 
pleasantry ? It may be the duty of a diplomat to He on 
occasion, but is it ever necessary to utter such a stupid 
falsehood ? The German Secretary of State sardonically 
added in the same conversation that he was not sure 
that the effort for peace had not hastened the declara- 
tion of war, as though the declaration of war against 
Servia had not been planned and expected from the first. 

As a final effort to meet quibbles, the British Ambas- 
sador at Berlin then suggested that after Austria had 
satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then 
be favorable for four disinterested Powers to discuss 
the situation and come forward with suggestions for 
preventing graver complications. 

To this proposal the German Secretary of State seem- 
ingly acquiesced, but, as usual, nothing whatever was 
done. 1 It is true that on July 29 Sir Edward Grey was 
assured by the German Ambassador that the German 
Foreign Office was 

' endeavoring to make Vienna explain in a satis- 
factory form at St. Petersburg the scope and exten- 
sion of Austrian proceedings in Servia ', 

but again the communications which the German 
Foreign Office sent to Vienna on this point have never 
yet been disclosed to the world. 2 

1 English ' White Paper ', No. 76. 
a English ' White Paper ', No. 84. 



38 THE DOUBLE ALLIANCE 

In this same conference Sir Edward Grey 

' urged that the German Government should suggest 
any method by which the influence of the four Powers 
could be used together to prevent war between Austria 
and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole 
idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to 
be put into operation by any method that Germany 
could suggest if mine were not acceptable. In fact, 
mediation was ready to come into operation by any 
method that Germany thought possible, if only Ger- 
many would " press the button " in the interests of 
peace ' - 1 

The difficulty was, however, that Germany never 
' pressed the button ' , although obviously it would have 
been easy for her to do so, as the stronger and more in- 
fluential member of the Double Alliance. 

On the same day the Austrian Government left a 
memorandum with Sir Edward Grey to the effect that 
Count Mensdorff said that the war with Servia must 
proceed. 

On the night of July 29 the British Ambassador at 
Berlin was informed that the German Foreign Office 
L had not had time to send an answer yet ' to the proposal 
that Germany suggest the form of mediation, but that 
the question had been referred to the Austro-Hungarian 
Government with a request as to ' what would satisfy 
them'. 2 

On the following day the German Ambassador in- 
formed Sir Edward Grey that the German Government 
would endeavor to influence Austria after taking Bel- 
grade, and Servian territory in the region of the frontier, 
to promise not to advance further, while the Powers 

1 English ' White Paper ', No. 84. 

2 English ' White Paper ', No. 107. 



VS. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 39 

endeavored to arrange that Servia should give satis- 
faction sufficient to pacify Austria, but if Germany ever 
exercised any such pressure upon Vienna, no evidence 
of it has ever been given to the world. Certainly, it was 
not very effective, and for the reasons mentioned it is 
impossible to conclude that the advice of Germany, if 
in good faith, would not have been followed by its 
weaker ally. 

From all that appears in the record, Austria made no 
reply to this most conciliatory suggestion of England 
but, in the meantime, the irrepressible Kaiser made the 
crisis more acute by cabling to the Czar that the mobili- 
zation of Russia to meet the mobilization of Austria 
was affecting his position as mediator, to which the 
Czar made a conciliatory reply, stating that Russia's 
mobilization was only for a defense against Austria. 

What more could Russia do ? If Austria continued 
to mobilize, why not Russia ? 

On this day, July 30, the German Ambassador had 
two interviews at St. Petersburg with Sazonof, and it 
was then that Sazonof drew up the following formula 
as a basis for peace : 

' If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with 
Servia has assumed character of question of European 
interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her 
ultimatum the points which violate principle of 
sovereignty of Servia, Russia engages to stop all 
military preparations.' 1 

At this stage King George telegraphed Prince Henry 
of Prussia that 

' the English Government was doing its utmost, sug- 
gesting to Russia and France to suspend further 
military preparations, if Austria will consent to be 

1 Russian ' Orange Paper ', No. 60. 



40 THE DOUBLE ALLIANCE 

satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and neigh- 
boring Servian territory as a hostage for satisfactory 
settlement of her demands, other countries meanwhile 
suspending their war preparation ' . 

The King adds a hope that the Kaiser 

' will use his great influence to induce Austria to accept 
this proposal, thus proving that Germany and Eng- 
land are working together to prevent what would be 
an international catastrophe '. 1 

This last proposition, however, was never accepted 
or declined, for the impetuous Kaiser gave his twelve- 
hour ultimatum to Russia to demobilize, and this was 
an arrogant demand which no self-respecting Power, 
much less so great a one as Russia, could possibly accept. 

While this demand was in progress Sir Edward Grey 
was making his last attempt to preserve peace by asking 
Germany to sound Vienna, as he would sound St. Peters- 
burg, whether it would be possible for the four disin- 
terested Powers to offer to Austria that they would 

' undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction 
of her demands on Servia, provided they did not 
embarrass Servian sovereignty and the integrity of 
Servian territory'. 

Sir Edward Grey went so far as to tell the German 
Ambassador that if this was not satisfactory, and if 
Germany would make any reasonable proposals to pre- 
serve peace and Russia and France rejected it, that 

' his Majesty's Government would have nothing to do 
with the consequences ', 

which obviously meant either neutrality or actual in- 
tervention in behalf of Germany and Austria. 

1 Second German ' White Paper '. 



VS. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 41 

On the same day the British Ambassador at Berlin 
besought the German Foreign Office to 

' put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do some- 
thing in the general interest to reassure Russia and to 
show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a 
friendly basis '. 

And Sir Edward Goschen reports that the German 
Foreign Minister replied that last night he had 

' begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and 
that he had received a reply to the effect that the 
Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take the 
wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter '. 

Again the text of the letter in which Germany ' begged ' 
Austria to be conciliatory is not found in the record. 

The excuse of Germany that the mobilization of Russia 
compelled it to mobilize does not justify the war. 
Mobilization does not necessarily mean aggression, but 
simply preparation. If Russia had the right to mobilize 
because Austria mobilized, Germany equally had the 
right to mobilize when Russia mobilized, but it does not 
follow that either of the three nations could justify a war 
to compel the other parties to demobilize. Mobilization 
is only a preparation against eventualities. It is the 
right of a sovereign State and by no code of ethics a 
casus belli. The demand of Germany that Russia could 
not arm to defend itself, when Austria was preparing for 
a possible attack on Russia, has few, if any, parallels in 
history for bullying effrontery. It treated Russia as an 
inferior, almost a vassal, State. 

This impetuous step of Germany, to compel its great 
neighbor to desist from military preparations to defend 
itself, came most inopportunely, for on August 1 the 
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador for the first time declared 



42 THE DOUBLE ALLIANCE 

to the Russian Government its willingness to discuss the 
terms of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and it was 
then suggested that the form of the ultimatum and the 
questions arising thereon should be discussed in London. 
(Dispatch from British Ambassador at Vienna .to Sir 
Edward Grey, dated Sept. 1, 1914.) Sir Edward Grey 
at once advised the English Ambassador in Berlin of the 
fact, and urged that it was still possible to maintain peace 

' if only a little respite in time can be gained before any 
great power begins war ', 

but the Kaiser, having issued the arrogant ultimatum to 
Russia to demobilize in twelve hours, had gone too far 
for retreat, and spurred on by the arrogant Potsdam 
military party he ' let loose the dogs of war '. 

The Judgment. 

These are the facts as shown by the record, and upon 
them, in my judgment, an impartial court would not 
hesitate to pass the following judgment : 

1- — That Germany and Austria in a time of profound 
peace secretly concerted together to impose their will upon 
Europe and upon Servia in a matter affecting the balance 
of power in Europe. Whether in so doing they intended 
to precipitate a European war to determine the mastery of 
Europe is not satisfactorily established, although their 
whole course of conduct suggests this as a possibility. 
They made war almost inevitable by (a) issuing an ulti- 
matum that was grossly unreasonable and dispropor- 
tionate to any grievance that Austria had and (b) in 
giving to Servia and Europe insufficient time to consider 
the rights and obligations of all interested nations. 

2 — That Germany had at all times the poiver to compel 
Austria to preserve a reasonable and conciliatory course, 



VS. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 43 

but at no time effectively exerted that influence. On the 
contrary, she certainly abetted, and possibly instigated, 
Austria in its unreasonable course. 

3 — That England, France, Italy, and Russia at all 
times sincerely ivorkedfor peace, and for this purpose not 
only overlooked the original misconduct of Austria but 
made every reasonable concession in the Iwpe of preserving 
peace. 

4 — That Austria, having mobilized its army, Russia 
was reasonably justified in mobilizing its forces. Such 
act of mobilization was the right of any sovereign State, 
and as long as the Russian armies did not cross the border 
or take any aggressive action no other nation had any just 
right to complain, each having the same right to make 
similar preparations. 

5 — That Germany, in abruptly declaring war against 
Russia for failure to demobilize ivhen the other Powers 
had offered to make any reasonable concession and peace 
parleys were still in progress, precipitated the war. 

In Conclusion. 

The writer of this article has reached these conclusions 
with reluctance, as he has a feeling of deep affection for 
the German people and equal admiration for their ideals 
and matchless progress. Even more he admires the 
magnificent courage with which the German nation, 
beset on every hand by powerful antagonists, is now 
defending its prestige as a nation. The whole-hearted 
devotion of this great nation to its flag is worthy of the 
best traditions of the Teutonic race. Nevertheless,, this 
cannot alter the ethical truth, which stands apart from 
any considerations of nationality ; nor can it affect the 
conclusion that the German nation has been plunged 



44 DOUBLE ALLIANCE VS. TRIPLE ENTENTE 

into this abyss by its scheming statesmen and its self- 
centred and highly-neurotic Kaiser, who in the twentieth 
century sincerely believes that he is the proxy of Almighty 
God on earth, and therefore infallible. 

In visiting its condemnation, the Supreme Court of 
Civilization should therefore distinguish between the 
military caste, headed by the Kaiser and the Crown 
Prince, which precipitated this great calamity, and the 
German people. 

The very secrecy of the plot against the peace of the 
world and the failure to disclose to the German people 
the diplomatic communications hereinbefore quoted, 
strongly suggest that this detestable war is not merely 
a crime against civilization, but also against the deceived 
and misled German people. They have a vision and are 
essentially progressive and peace-loving in their national 
characteristics, while the ideals of their military caste 
are those of the dark ages. 

One day the German people will know the full truth 
and then there will be a dreadful reckoning for those who 
have plunged a noble and peace-loving nation into this 
abyss of disaster. 

' The mills of God grind slowly, 
But they grind exceeding small, 

With patience He stands watching, 
With exactness grinds He all.' 



OXFORD PAMPHLETS 

1914 



Crown 8vo, from 12 to 40 pages each. Also 
in series of five Pamphlets, stiff covers. 
One Shilling net each series. 33 Pamphlets 
have now (18 November) been issued and 
others are in preparation, The historical 
pieces are illustrated by sketch-maps 



1 . The Deeper Causes of the War. 

By W. Sanday. 3d. net. Fifth Impression. 
The psychology of Prussian militarism ; German public opinion and 
Germany's aggressive ambitions. 

2. To the Christian Scholars of Europe and America : 
A Reply from Oxford to the German ' Address to 

Evangelical Christians '. 2d. net: Fourth Impression. 
The answer of Oxford theologians to a recent manifesto of the 
German evangelical theologians. This manifesto, which is reproduced in 
the present pamphlet, argues that Germany is in no sense responsible for 
the present war. The Oxford reply states that the German theologians 
cannot have studied either the events which led up to the war or the 
political utterances of their own countrymen. 

3. The Responsibility for the War. 

By W. G. S. Adams. 2d. net. 
A brief discussion of the question of responsibility : 1. Austria and 
Serbia ; 2. The responsibility of Russia ; 3. The intervention of England. 

4s. Great Britain and Germany. 

By Spenser Wilkinson. 2d. net. Third Impression. 
Three letters to the Springfield Republican: 1. By Prof. Spenser 
Wilkinson, stating Great Britain's case ; 2. By Prof. John W. Burgess of 
the University of Columbia, stating Germany's case ; 3. By Prof. Wilkin- 
son, in reply to Prof. Burgess. 

5. ' Just for a Scrap of Paper.' 

By Arthur Hassall. Id. net. Fourth Impression. 
Explains why England stands for the sanctity of European treaty- law. 



II 

6. The Germans, their Empire, and how they have 

made it. By C. R. L. Fletcher. 2d. net. Fourth Impression. 
A historical account of Prussian policy from the seventeenth century. 

7. The Germans, their Empire, and what they covet. 

By C. R. L. Fletcher, 2d. net. Fourth Impression. 
An account of the ambitions avowed by the Pan-German school. 

8. Might is Right. 

By Sir Walter Raleigh. 2d. net. Second Impression. 
Why Germany may win ; what will happen if she wins ; why we 
believe she will not win. 

9. Austrian Policy since 1867. 

By Murray Beaven. 3d. net. Second Impression. 
Austrian policy in the Balkans has been of the ' offensive-defensive ' 
order. The Archduke Francis Ferdinand might have saved Austria from 
rushing to destruction ; but 1912 was the beginning of the end. 

10. Italian Policy since 1870. 

By Keith Feiling. 2d. net. Second Impression, 
Italian policy has been and must be guided by her own interests. 
The results of her colonial policy have not yet been satisfactory enough 
to tempt her into adventures. 

Ill 

11. French Policy since 1871. 

By F. Morgan and H. W. C. Davis. 2d. net. Fourth 
Impression. 
A historical sketch, discussing the question whether French policy 
has been aggressive. 

12. Russia: The Psychology of a Nation. 

By Paul Vinogradoff. Id. net. Fourth Impression. 
A reply to the German taunt that Russia is still in a state of 
barbarism, and is the enemy of European civilization. 

13. Serbia and the Serbs. 

By Sir Valentine Chirol. 2d. net. Third Impression. 
A sketch of Serbian history, which is incidentally an indictment 
of the policy pursued by Austria-Hungary towards the Serbian kingdom. 

14. Germany and ' The Fear of Russia '. 

By Sir Valentine Chirol. 2d. net. Third Impression. 
Shows that before 1879 Germany preferred Russia as an ally to Austria. 
The ambition of Germany to establish a protectorate over Turkey has led 
her to assist Austria in the Balkans and so to challenge Russia. 

15. The Eastern Question. 

By F. F. Urquhart. 3d. net. Third Impression. 
The history of the Balkan nations ; their future. 



Published separately and will also appear shoi 
in series. 

Thoughts on the War. 

By Gilbert Murray. 2d. net. 
An article written in August and now reprinted. 



orW 



Bacilli and Bullets. 

By Sir William Osler. Id. net. Fourth Impression. 

Calls attention to the fact that disease kills more men than the bullet. 
The most dangerous diseases are preventable by inoculation. 

The Navy and the War. 

By J. R. Thursfield. 3d. net. Second Impression. 

Estimates the military and economic value of the silent pressure 
exercised by our fleet, and warns the faint-hearted and the captious of the 
perils of lack of faith. 

The Retreat from Mons. 

By H. W. C. Davis. 3d. net. Third 

Introduction ; the Dispatch of Sept. 9 ; tht 
Office, published Aug. 31. Appendixes (soldiers' n. 

The Leading Ideas of British Policy. 

By Gerard Collier. 2d. net. 
Examines the political genius of England. | 

Greek Policy since 1882. 

By A. J. Toynbee. 4d. net. 

Poland, Prussia, and Culture. 

By Ludwik Ehrlich. 3d. net. 

The author is a Doctor of the University of Lwdw (Lemberg) In 
Galicia. 

The Germans in Africa. 

^ns Lewin. 3d. net. 

^in preparation, 




L1BKHKT ur <.UMUI« 



021 395 441 



IV 

,. War against War. 

By A. D. Lindsay. 2d. net. Third Impression. 
Denies that war is good in itself, or a necessary evil. Power is not 
the sole or chief end for which the State exists. National greatness, 
if founded on brute force, cannot endure. International law represents 
an ideal, but an ideal that may be realized. 

17. The Value of Small States. 

By H. A. L. Fisher. 2d. net. Third Impression. 
The author argues that the debt of civilization to small states is 
incalculable. They are useful, at the present time, as laboratories of 
political experiments and as buffer-states between the greater powers. 

18. How can War ever be Right ? 

By Gilbert Murray. 2d. net. Fourth Impression. 
A well-known lover of peace and advocate of pacific policies argues 
against the Tolstoyan position. Right and honour compelled Britain to 
make war ; and war — like tragedy — is not pure evil. 

19. The National Principle and the War. 

By Ramsay Muir. 3d. net. Second Impression. 
Considers the principle of nationality and its application to the settle- 
ment of Europe — particularly of S. E. Europe — after the War. 

20. J^ietzsche and Treitschke : The Worship of 
to •, Power in Modern Germany. 

E. Barker. 2d. net. Fourth Impression. 

;xplanation of the main points of interest in the ethical and 

loctrines of the German ruling classes. 

V 
x. The British Dominions and the War. 

By H. E. Egfrton. 2d. net. Second Impression. 
Explains the ideas for which the British Empire stands, and the 
political and moral issues of the war affecting the Dominions. 

22. India and the War. 

By Sir Ernest Trevelyan. Id. net. Third Impression. 
Discusses the reasons which account for the striking manifestations 
of Indian loyalty. 

23. Is the British Empire the Result of Wholesale 

Robbery ? By H. E. Egerton. 2d. net. 
A historical sketch in answer to a common taunt. 

24. The Law of Nations and the War. 

By A. Pearce Higgins. 2d. net. Second Impression. 
The violation of Belgian neutrality and the conduct of England to 
Denmark in 1807 ; the doctrine of German lawyers that military necessity 
overrides the laws of war; the balance of power and V^-"" 
treaties. 

25. England's Mission. By W. |^™ Impression. 
Answers the question, In what cause / ' u ure ° 



B>1 



/ 



